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Abstract
This paper takes as its starting point Henry Neuburger’s injunction that taxation
must be seen as a contribution to the maintenance of the welfare state, not as a
dead-weight burden. It sets recent developments in the UK tax ratio in the
context of changes in public spending, particularly on welfare services, in the
public sector’s balance sheet, and the distributional effects of both tax and
spending. It then discusses tax and transfer policy since the change of
governance in May 1997 in the context of public attitudes to inequality and
different forms of redistribution. It compares the distributional effects of the
four Labour Budgets since July 1997 with those which would have resulted
from simply indexing the April 1997 tax and social security system for income
growth. This suggests that actual reforms will on average deliver as much to
lower income groups as income indexation would have done, but at lower cost
to the public finances, and in a way which is more consistent with public
attitudes. However, delays between Budget announcements and implementation
meant that inequality and relative poverty increased in Labour’s first two years
in office. If further progress is to be made towards the target of abolishing child
poverty in a generation, the measures so far announced will have to be added to
each year.
1In economic management and in politics, there is little escape from the
discussion of tax. Tax revenue has represented between one third and two-fifths
of total national income over the last twenty years, so its scale and design has
major effects on the economy. Decisions on how much tax should be levied on
different kinds of activity or individuals is one of the central decisions of British
politics – hardly surprising with £10,000 to be raised every second. But much of
this discussion treats tax as if it was simply a loss to those who pay it and to the
economy as a whole, rather than as a vital mechanism to ensure that collective
aims can be met and for ends which the market would fail to achieve. As Henry
Neuburger put it in a paper for the Fabian Society Taxation Review,
‘... we have to promote the idea of tax as a contribution to the
maintenance of the welfare state and not as a deadweight burden ...
A modern democratic state requires adequate levels of taxation.
The most consistent poll finding we have about tax is that a large
majority of people agree with this analysis. ... They believe in the
productive enabling state and the means to finance it’ (1989, pp.1
and 5).
The tax system is not there only – or indeed, mainly – as a redistributive
mechanism. Its role is also to finance the provision of goods and services from
which everyone benefits. To understand its function and effects, we have to
look at spending at the same time. The overall level of taxation is largely
determined by the amount of government spending required, while the effect of
government on distribution can only be understood by looking at tax and
spending together. Analysing their joint impact is becoming even more
important as the Government increasingly uses the tax system – through a
widening use of ‘tax credits’ – instead of what were formerly social security
benefits.
This paper sets out the background against which decisions on the tax
system are taken, looking at trends in taxation and spending over the last twenty
years, at their impact on distribution, and at what we know of public preferences
for them. It then considers the impact of recent changes in tax policy since the
1997 change of government.
21. The level of  taxation and public spending
Figure 1 shows how the tax ratio (total tax and National Insurance Contributions
as a share of national income) has varied since 1978-79. A first point to note is
how narrow in some ways the variation is. From an inherited level of just over
33 per cent, the Thatcher government took tax to 39 per cent of GDP in 1982,
near the lowest point of the recession. It then fell back through both the
recovery of the late 1980s and the recession of the early 1990s, reaching a low
point in 1993-94 back at 33 per cent, before rising again through the recovery of
the later 1990s to reach 37 per cent by the end of the decade.
Source: HM Treasury (2000a), Tables C22 and C23.
There is little clear trend over the period (or indeed, looking further back
to the start of the 1970s), despite the political sound and fury. Some of the
movements relate to the economic cycle, with a tendency for the ratio to fall in
economic booms as the denominator, national income, grows rapidly (for
instance, 1973, 1979 and the late 1980s) and to rise in recessions (notably the
mid-1970s and early 1980s). But politics or the driving force of the public
finances can buck such trends, as with the tax-cutting policies set in the run-up
to the 1992 election and the subsequent rise to cut back public borrowing
afterwards.
Figure 1: Tax ratio 1978-79 to 1999-00
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3One result of this comparative stability over the last quarter century is
that the UK has moved from being a country with a fairly typical level of
taxation amongst industrialised countries to being firmly in the low tax half of
the range. Figure 2 shows that by 1996, Britain’s tax ratio (in this case,
measured in relation to GNP) put it fourteenth out of the twenty-one countries
listed. A similar ranking in 1986 would have put the UK above Spain, Canada
and Italy; back in 1975 its ratio was just above the mid-point of the international
range.1
Source: Fugeman (1999), Table 1.
Note: *1995 figures
The scale of variations between countries is far greater than the range
over time in the UK. Four countries including France had tax ratios 10 or more
per cent of GNP above that in the UK in 1996, while the lowest, Korea, was ten
points below it. Only two other countries, Spain and Iceland, had ratios within
the range in which British tax revenues have been confined for the last quarter
century. Whatever it is that has constrained this measure of the state in Britain,
it is clearly not an iron law of the economics of modern economies. Other
                                                
1 Fugeman (1999), Table 1; Hills (1996), Figure 4.3.
Figure 2: Tax ratios 1996
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4countries – some more successful economically, other less so – have made very
different choices.
One of the drivers behind the trends here has of course been the level of
public spending. Figure 3 shows the evolution over the same period of two
measures of public spending. General Government Expenditure combines
central and local government current and capital spending (with proceeds from
privatisation counted as a negative item, significantly reducing it in the second
half of the 1980s). Total Managed Expenditure – the total on which policy now
tends to focus – includes spending by publicly owned corporations beyond their
trading revenues as well (a much smaller part of the economy now than in the
past). Both measures include depreciation of publicly owned capital as a
spending item, amounting to £14 billion in 1999-00 or 1.6 per cent of GDP.2 In
looking at the public accounts it should be remembered that this counts as a
revenue item too, deriving from the capital the public sector owns rather than
being financed by tax or borrowing. It also has to be deducted when measuring
net investment – the extent to which the state is adding to its capital stock.
For most of the period, tax revenues have been well below either measure
of public spending, with particularly wide gaps at the start of the period shown
and in the early 1990s. In contrast to the stability of the tax ratio, there has been
a trend towards lower public spending as a share of GDP since 1975-76, when
Total Managed Expenditure reached a peak of nearly 50 per cent of GDP.
Alongside this, there are clear swings with the economic cycle, with spending
on some items like social security rising in recession (and with the denominator,
national income, shrinking in the worst recessions).
                                                
2 HM Treasury (2000b), Table 1.5.
5Source: HM Treasury (2000a), Table C22 and C23.
Notably, however, the experience of different items within the public
spending total has been very different, as can be seen for recent years in Figure
4. In 1983-84, the three largest elements of the welfare state, health, education
and social security totalled about 22 per cent of national income, or 46 per cent
of public spending (TME). By 1999-00 they still represented 21.5 per cent of
national income, but this was 56 per cent of public spending.3 This is part of a
longer-term pattern of stability – spending on the welfare state as a whole
(including housing and personal social services) has fluctuated around a quarter
of national income for the whole of the period since 1975.4 When people talk
about the ‘inexorable growth of the welfare state’, they are talking about a
period which ended a generation ago, at the time of the oil crisis and the IMF
visit to the UK, predating Mrs Thatcher’s election.
                                                
3 The plans in the 2000 Spending Review (HM Treasury, 2000c, tables A1 and A2
imply health spending rising by about 0.9 per cent of GDP between 1999-00 and
2003-04, and education spending by 0.8 per cent of GDP, while social security falls
by 0.4 per cent of GDP, giving a total of just under 23 per cent.
4 Glennerster and Hills (1998).
Figure 3:  Tax and public spending 1978-79 to 1999-00
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6Source: HM Treasury (2000b), Table 4.4, and earlier equivalents.
By contrast, one of the big losers has been defence spending – halved as a
share of national income between 1984-85 and 1997-98 – while there were also
notable falls in spending on housing, transport, trade and industry, and debt
interest. But perhaps the most striking change has been the ‘enormous fall in
public investment’ highlighted by Corry and Neuburger (1997, p.80). The high
levels of net public sector borrowing in earlier periods and their more recent
falls have to be seen against the background of what was once substantial new
public investment. Figure 5 shows the longer term pattern for both public sector
net borrowing and net capital expenditure (net of depreciation of existing
assets).
What this figure makes plain is the contrast between two periods of high
borrowing, the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s. In the earlier period high public
borrowing was mainly to finance high public investment. After 1975-76, both
fell rapidly, with net borrowing briefly negative in the late 1980s, while net
investment fell to near zero – gross investment was barely above depreciation.
The huge increase in net borrowing, nearly reaching 8 per cent of GDP in 1992-
93 and 1993-94, did not correspond, however, to a surge in investment, but
rather to the effects of current spending rising as recession bit, combined with
taxes cut ahead of the 1992 election on the strength of what turned out to be
wildly optimistic revenue forecasts.5
                                                
5 Hills (1996), table 4.4.
Figure 4: Government spending as % GDP 
1983-84 to 1998-99
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7Source: HM Treasury (2000a), Tables C22 and C23.
The relationship between these two totals has been given much greater
importance by the current Government through its adoption of the ‘Golden
Rule’ in designing its fiscal policies – that over the economic cycle net
borrowing should be no greater than net capital spending, a rule which appeared
to be being met in its early years in government for the first time since the early
1970s.
One reason for this rule is the idea of equity between the generations.
Another is that of long-term sustainability. Either way, it is argued this
generation of policy-makers should not be running the public finances in such a
way that later generations will be forced to raise taxes higher than now without
any benefit in terms of later public services. Another way of looking at this is
through the public sector’s balance sheet – the balance between its assets and its
liabilities. The most recent official estimates of this are shown in Figure 6 for
the same period since 1970-71.
Figure 5:  Public sector net borrowing and capital spending
1970-71 to 1999-00
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8Source: HM Treasury (2000a), Table C23.
Part of what drives this picture is what we have already seen in Figure 5 –
the balance between public borrowing and capital spending. But a more detailed
look shows that the pattern is more complicated than this. In particular,
throughout the 1970s public sector debt was falling as a proportion of GDP,
despite the high levels of net borrowing. The reason for this was inflation. With
public debt denominated in cash, its value fell as prices rose. In ‘inflation-
adjusted’ terms, the public sector was actually not borrowing for much of this
period.6 At the same time, it was investing, so the net worth of the public sector
rose from 40 per cent of GDP at the start of the 1970s to reach 78 per cent in
1974. This continued a trend of improvement in this measure since at least the
late 1950s.7 Through the 1980s, the picture is more mixed, with debt falling in
relation to national income at the same time as assets (partly as a result of
privatisation). In the first half of the1990s, however, net worth falls dramatically
– reflecting high borrowing at a time of lower inflation, but low net investment
(and continuing privatisation).
In thinking about both generational equity and sustainability, what some of the
key fiscal numbers mean is thus very different in what currently appears to be a
low inflation world from what they meant in the 1970s and 1980s. This is not
                                                
6 Taylor and Threadgold (1979).
7 Hills (1996), table 4.1.
Figure 6:  Public Sector Balance Sheet 1970-71 to 1999-00
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9the only reason for caution over the meaning of the balance sheet items shown
in Figure 6. The public sector has other assets and liabilities beyond these. The
largest of these liabilities is the promises it has made to pay pensions in the
future. The capitalised value of people’s rights to the basic pension alone
exceeds a year’s worth of national income, which would turn the net worth of
the public sector negative throughout the period shown. Then again, the
Thatcher government started the 1980s with the prospect of substantial oil
revenues from the North Sea – by the early 1990s revenues equivalent to a
windfall asset of more than a third of a year’s national income had been used
up. Their virtual disappearance puts the comparative stability of public sector
net worth in the 1980s in a different light. The loss of most of this revenue also
created part of the hole in the public finances which emerged under the Major
government.
2. The balance of  taxation
When people talk about what is happening to tax, they often focus on income
tax, and particularly on the rates of income tax – for instance, the 22 per cent
‘basic rate’ which most people pay on any additional income, or the 40 per cent
paid at the margin by people with taxable income (after allowances) of more
than £28,400 (2000-01 system). The Thatcher government is thought to have
been ‘tax cutting’ principally because it reduced income tax rates, even though,
as Figure 1 showed, the total tax ratio rose thanks to increases in other tax rates
such as those of Value Added Tax (VAT) and National Insurance Contributions
(NICs). The Blair government’s pledge before the 1997 election was, similarly,
not to increase income tax rates – indeed, the basic rate was cut in April 2000.
This did not prevent a rise in the tax ratio in its early years, nor some people
paying more income tax, as allowances like mortgage interest relief or the
Married Couples’ Allowance were abolished.
Yet, as Table 1 shows, income tax is responsible for only 28 per cent of
all tax revenues. The rest comes from a variety of somewhat less politically
visible sources – notably VAT and NICs (each one sixth of the total) and
Corporation Tax (a tenth). Conventionally, the first five items in the table are
often described as direct taxes – individuals and businesses pay them according
to the amounts of income they receive – while taxes like VAT or those on fuel,
cars, alcohol and tobacco are described as indirect taxes – tax is collected by
businesses as they sell goods and services, and the amounts people pay do not
depend on their incomes.
Table 1: Taxes and National Insurance Contributions 1999-2000
£ billion % total
10
Income tax (net) 92.3 27.7
NICs 56.4 16.9
Corporation tax (excluding North Sea) 32.9 9.9
North Sea 2.5 0.7
Capital taxes 11.0 3.3
VAT 56.7 17.0
Fuel and VED 27.2 8.2
Alcohol and tobacco 12.0 3.6
Other indirect 6.2 1.9
Council tax and business rates 28.3 8.5
Other 8.0 2.4
Total 333.6 100.0
Source: HM Treasury (2000a), Table C9.
As a country, Britain makes greater use of indirect taxes than most.
OECD figures suggest that only Korea out of fifteen other industrialised
countries raises as great a proportion of tax from indirect sources.8 Most other
countries raise much more from social security contributions, the equivalent of
our National Insurance Contributions. France, Germany, and the Netherlands
raise more than 40 per cent of tax revenue from them, more than twice the
proportion here. This reflects the much greater importance (and generosity) of
social insurance in those countries as a way of funding items like pensions and
hence of contributions.
Over the Conservative years from 1979 to 1997, direct taxes became less
and indirect taxes more important. This was mostly, as Table 2 shows, because
VAT rose from 9 to 17 per cent of the total, coincidentally mirroring the
increase in the main rate of VAT from 8 to 17.5 per cent. As Neuburger (1989)
discusses, Labour has traditionally been linked to preferring direct taxes and
Conservatives to indirect taxes, while the greater visibility of the former has
worked to Labour’s political disadvantage. As he goes on to argue, these
preferences reflect the assumed greater progressivity of direct taxes on the one
side, and the idea that indirect taxes interfere less with freedom on the other. He
suggests that both ideas are spurious. The second certainly is. Any tax, whatever
it is called and however it is collected, puts a ‘wedge’ between people’s income
and the (pre-tax) value of the goods and services they purchase. It does not
                                                
8 Fugeman (1997), Table 4. This counts the council tax and business rates in the UK as
indirect taxes on the grounds that they are effectively levied on consumption,
although a case could be made that at least part of the effect of council tax is more
like that of other direct taxes.
11
really matter very much in the end whether someone has an income of £100,
pays £20 income tax, and then buys £80-worth of VAT-free goods or
alternatively has a tax free income of £100 and buys goods for £100, including
£20 of VAT. Both kinds of tax mean that people can consume less from the
market than otherwise (in return for the services provided through the state).
Both change the pattern of returns to and costs of different kinds of behaviour.
It is also true that indirect taxes are not necessarily regressive (forming a
greater share of income of the poor) and direct taxes are not necessarily
progressive (forming a greater share of the income of the rich). The Poll Tax
was effectively a direct tax, but was highly regressive. Certain kinds of
consumption – ‘luxuries’ – do represent a greater share of income for the rich
than the poor. In his analysis of this Henry Neuburger identified items like
meals out, car purchase, recreation, holidays and financial services – including
saving – which would be more progressive to tax than income.
12
Table 2: Tax composition 1978-79 and 1999-00
Share of total tax revenue (%)
1978-79 1999-00
Income tax1 32.9 27.7
National Insurance Contributions2 21.1 16.9
Corporation Tax3 6.9 9.9
Capital taxes4 2.0 3.3
VAT 8.6 17.0
Other indirect 17.6 13.7
Rates/Council tax 10.1 8.5
North Sea 0.9 0.7
Other5 - 2.4
All 100 100
Notes:
1. Net of tax credits in 1999-00 (would be 28.3% if measured gross)
2 .Includes NI surcharge in 1978-79
3. Includes Advance Corporation Tax.  Excludes North Sea revenues
4. Includes Development Land Tax in 1978-79
5. Includes National Lottery ‘good causes’
Source: Kay and King (1980), Table 1; HM Treasury (2000a), Table
However, in practice, indirect taxes clearly are much less progressive
than direct taxes. Table 3 shows figures derived from the Office for National
Statistics’ analysis of the impact of different kinds of taxation by income in
1998-99. Figure 7 summarises the picture. The most striking finding from this is
that the British tax system is not, on this analysis, progressive. Overall the taxes
allocated by ONS represent 37.1 per cent of household gross income (including
income from cash benefits as well as from market sources). But for the richest
tenth of households they are below this, and for the poorest tenth they are much
higher.9 In particular, indirect taxes represent 35 per cent of gross income for
the poorest, but only 11 per cent for the richest. As is well known, taxes on
tobacco are strikingly regressive but taxes on fuel and cars are also regressive.
Table 3: Tax as Share of Gross Income by Income Group 1998-99 (%)
Households by tenth of equivalised disposable income
                                                
9 Part of this stems from the high expenditure of households in the poorest tenth in
relation to their reported income. To the extent that this reflects misreported or
temporary and atypically low income, these figures will overstate the tax burdens at
the bottom.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All
Income Tax 3.4 3.9 4.8 7.3 9.4 11.2 12.4 13.8 15.3 19.8 13.5
Employee NICs 1.5 1.8 2.2 3.4 4.1 4.6 5.1 5.4 5.2 5.3 4.2
Local tax (net) 7.7 5.6 4.8 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 1.6 3.0
All direct 12.6 11.3 11.9 15.1 17.4 19.2 20.7 21.9 22.9 24.9 20.7
VAT 13.1 8.8 8.6 8.0 7.6 7.8 7.2 6.7 6.2 5.0 6.8
Tobacco 4.0 3.1 2.3 2.3 2.0 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.7 0.2 1.1
Alcohol 1.9 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.9
Fuel and VED 4.3 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.2 1.3 2.3
Employer NICs 3.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.0 1.4
Other indirect 8.7 5.9 5.5 4.9 4.6 4.4 4.2 3.9 3.3 2.6 3.9
All indirect 35.0 23.6 22.1 20.8 19.6 18.7 17.6 16.2 14.5 10.8 16.4
Total 47.7 34.9 33.9 35.9 37.0 37.9 38.3 38.1 37.4 35.7 37.1
Source: Harris (2000), Table 2A (Appendix 1).
Source: Table 4.
It is hard to make such analyses definitive – to do so, one has to have a
clear idea of the incidence of a tax – who is really worse off compared with
what would have happened without the tax? In this example, the NICs which
employers pay as a percentage of the earnings of their employees are classed as
Figure 7:  Tax by income group, 1998-99
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an addition to their costs, and are assumed to be borne by consumers, creating
their regressive impact. Just as plausibly one could argue that they are as much
a wedge between gross labour costs to employers and net pay to employees as
income tax and so should be treated the same way. If this was done, they would
be shown as more progressive than the employee NICs at the top of the table
(because employer contributions are not subject to the earnings limit beyond
which employee contributions do not increase – £535 per week in 2000-01).
Allowing for such uncertainty, the clearest conclusion is that for most of the
income range, the British tax system is roughly proportional – one way or
another, most income groups pay about the same share of income in tax. But it
is only so because of the contribution of direct taxes. Three factors drive the
regressivity of indirect taxes:
 People with higher incomes save more (and savings are not subject to
indirect taxes – and are not likely to be);
 More of the consumption of those with lower incomes goes on heavily
taxed items like tobacco (despite the VAT exemption of necessities like
food and lower rates on fuel); and
 Many indirect taxes are set as lump sum amounts (such as vehicle
licences or the part of tax on wine which is a fixed amount per bottle
whether cheap or expensive).
Again, however, it is important not to look at the impact of taxation in
isolation, and assume, for instance, that this means that the state does not have a
redistributive effect. The tax system may not be progressive in itself, but what it
finances certainly is. Figure 8 shows from the same source the ONS’s allocation
of both taxes and the benefits of most parts of public spending between income
groups. The poorest tenth may pay most tax as a share of its income, but this
amount – about £3,000 per household in 1998-99 – is much lower than the
amounts allocated to it from social security and from benefits in kind from
public services like the NHS and state education, totalling nearly £9,000 per
household. The net gain averages nearly £6,000. The same balance holds for the
next four tenths of the distribution, although to a declining extent. At the top,
tax may be a smaller share of gross income, but the absolute amount –
averaging nearly £24,000 – is much greater than the benefits allocated of around
£3,000. As with the allocation of the impact of taxation, the precise way the
benefits of public spending are allocated here can be questioned, and taking a
longer-term lifetime perspective moderates the results,10 but the overall effect is
clear: the combination of taxation and the spending it finances is redistributive.
                                                
10 See Sefton (1997) and Falkingham and Hills (1995) for detailed discussion of these
issues.
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Source: Harris (2000).
3. What do people want?
Conventional political wisdom has been that voters want lower taxes and will
vote for parties that promise them. In the run-up to the 1997 election, Labour’s
pledge on income tax rates was backed up with a promise to hold to the
Conservatives’ very tight spending plans for the following two years. As a
result, and helped by a strong economy and falling unemployment, spending
(TME) fell from 41.2 per cent of GDP in 1996-97 to 37.7 per cent in 1999-
2000.11
This belief appears to conflict with what remains one of the consistent
findings from the long-running British Social Attitudes survey (and from other
polls). Since the late 1980s there has been a large majority for increased public
spending on ‘health, education and social benefits’, even if this means higher
taxes, and only a tiny proportion of the population opts for lower taxes and
lower spending on these items. Nearly two-thirds of respondents continued to
                                                
11 HM Treasury (2000c), table 49. The plans in the 2000 Spending Review would take
TME to 40.5 per cent of GDP in 2003-04.
Figure 8: Distribution of taxes and benefits, 1998-99
-18000
-12000
-6000
0
6000
Bottom
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Top
£1/year
Te
nt
hs
 o
f h
ou
se
ho
ld
s 
by
 e
qu
iv
al
en
t i
nc
om
e
Cash benef its
Benefits in kind
Direct taxes
Indirect taxes
16
choose the increased tax and spending option in 1998 during Labour’s first two
years of spending restraint.12 Even amongst respondents to the 1998 survey who
identified with the Conservative party a narrow majority (51 per cent) preferred
increased taxes and spending on these items. 70 per cent or more of Labour and
Liberal Democrat identifiers wanted higher spending, and only 25 per cent of
either group wanted the current levels. People do indeed seem to support
taxation to finance the ‘enabling state’.
However, simply wanting more tax and spend does not necessarily mean
much more. Heath and Curtice (1998) show that until 1994 a majority saw
Labour as being to their left on the balance between tax and spending: people
wanted more spending, but feared Labour would go too far. After then, opinion
became much more balanced between those who thought Labour would do too
much or too little. Second, different items have higher or lower priority,
particularly if the personal consequences of higher taxes are spelt out. Brook,
Hall and Preston (1996) show in their analysis of the 1995 BSA survey that
majorities remain for higher health and education spending when people are
given specific tax consequences for themselves, but not for other items like the
police, the environment, and defence. It is little coincidence that health and
education have been Labour’s spending priorities in office, with Labour now
committed to increasing health spending rapidly in the next four years – with
plans which would take NHS spending to 6.3 per cent of national income by
2003-0413 compared to 5.3 per cent in 1996-97 and 5.2 per cent in 1998-99, the
second of the two years of fiscal restraint. Nor is it a surprise that Conservative
politicians have committed themselves to match these figures.
But what of the more explicitly redistributive part of public spending –
the social security budget? First, inequality is unpopular.14 Four fifths of
respondents to the 1998 British Social Attitudes survey say that the gap between
those with high incomes and those with low incomes in Britain today is too
large. Furthermore, three-quarters say it is ‘definitely’ or ‘probably’
Government’s responsibility to do something about it, against only a sixth who
say it is not. When tax is specified as an instrument, more than half say that
‘Government should increase taxes on the better-off to spend more on the poor’,
and only a sixth prefer the statement that ‘the better-off pay too much tax
already’. However, if the instruments are more closely specified, the scale of
agreement reduces. More, but now under half, agree that more should be spent
on welfare benefits for the poor, and a quarter disagree, but only 39 per cent
agree that government should redistribute income from the better-off to those
who are less well off, while the proportion disagreeing rises to 31 per cent.
                                                
12 Hills and Lelkes (1999).
13 HM Treasury (2000a), tables 5.1 and C3.
14 For further details of these findings see Hills and Lelkes (1999).
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Looking at attitudes to the benefit system in more detail reveals a conflict
in people’s minds. On the one hand, a large majority believes that
unemployment benefits are too little to live on (and this reaches 80 per cent
when the amounts of benefit are actually specified). On the other, there are
increasing concerns about the extent to which benefits for the unemployed
cause disincentives and are open to fraud. Until 1996, when asked to choose
between the two propositions, that unemployment benefits are too low and
cause hardship or are too high and discourage work, the larger group of
respondents chose the former.15 However, the gap had been narrowing and in
1998, the larger group chose the ‘too high and discourage work’ option.
These competing concerns about inequality, the low level of benefits,
disincentives and fraud mean that people react differently to options for
different kinds of benefits, as Table 4 shows. In line with the preference for
higher spending on ‘health, education and social benefits’ described above,
people generally say they want higher spending on social security benefits.
More than two-thirds say they want higher spending on benefits for those who
care for those who are sick and disabled, disabled people who cannot work,
retired people, and parents who work on very low incomes. Very few call for
lower benefits for these groups. When it comes to single parents the largest
group opts for the status quo, although more still opt for extra spending than
lower on benefits for this group. By contrast, while the largest group again go
for the status quo for benefits for unemployed people, in this case more say they
would like to see lower than higher spending on them.
Table 4: Would you like to see more or less government spending on
benefits for…
Spend
more
Spend the
same as
now
Spend
less
People who care for sick or disabled 82 15   1
Disabled people who cannot work 72 23   2
Retired people 71 25   2
Parents who work on very low incomes 68 26   3
Single parents 34 41 21
Unemployed people 22 40 35
Base: 3146
Source: Hills and Lelkes (1999) based on British Social Attitudes survey.
                                                
15 Unpublished information kindly supplied by the National Centre for Social Research
from the partial survey in 1997 shows this was still true then.
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These responses have two important implications. First, as with health
and education spending, public preferences are clearly for increases in spending
on the bulk of the items making up social security, even if this means higher
taxes, rather than the reverse. What is often not realised is that social security
spending is overwhelmingly on the groups which are favoured in the table. Only
21 per cent of the 1998-99 social security budget went on the non-disabled
population of working age; only 6 per cent directly on the unemployed.16
But second, policies based on across-the-board benefit increases would
not necessarily be popular if benefits aimed at the unemployed were included.
This does not necessarily reflect lack of concern about unemployment, poverty
or inequality. It may be as much a judgement about appropriate instruments.
Two-thirds of the 1998 BSA survey respondents agreed that, ‘it should be the
government’s responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one’ – a
policy going well beyond the measures included in the ‘New Deal’ (against a
quarter who said it should not be). ‘Jobs not higher benefits’ would best
summarise public attitudes to the unemployed in general. Again, it is perhaps
unsurprising that the Government’s welfare reform slogan has been ‘work for
those who can, security for those who cannot’.
4. Recent developments in taxation
Some of the key developments in policy under the Labour government since
1997 have been described above, notably the adoption of the ‘Golden Rule’ for
the public finances, the election pledge not to raise income tax rates, the tight
constraints on public spending in 1997-98 and 1998-99, and the rapid increases
in health and education spending planned from 2000-01. But another central
part of policy has been in its agenda on work and poverty. First, the centre piece
of its initial policies was the ‘New Deal’ for the unemployed, with a series of
measures designed to support people – focussing initially on the young
unemployed but extended to other groups without work – into jobs. This was
financed by a one-off £5.2 billion ‘windfall tax’ on some of the utilities
privatised by the Conservatives. Second, early in 1999, Tony Blair promised to
‘end child poverty’ within 20 years, and a series of measures in the Budgets
between 1998 and 2000 channelled extra resources to families with children in
particular, but also to others with low incomes.
A key innovation to serve both the aim of promoting work (by ensuring
that ‘work pays’) and of attacking child poverty has been the replacement since
October 1999 of what was a social security benefit for low paid families with
                                                
16 DSS (2000a), chart 1.1.
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children, Family Credit, with a new Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC).
This is more generous than its predecessor, is withdrawn more slowly as
earnings rise, and is intended to be administered differently – through the tax
system and the pay packet, rather than paid out as a benefit. It remains to be
seen whether the change in payment system has the psychological effects which
are hoped for it – reducing stigma and linking the payment to work rather than
being seen as a hand-out – and whether the administrative systems cope as
people move between jobs and in and out of work. Initial analysis suggests that
the impact of increased incentives to work on employment will be positive, but
relatively modest.17 However, the distributional effects are clear and substantial.
Note: Includes Child Tax Credit, full reform of NICs and June/Oct 2000 increases in child
elements of WFTC and HB/CTB. Rent assumed to be £50 per week, and Council Tax £14 per
week.
Figure 9 illustrates how the credit works, showing the relationship
between gross and net income resulting from the interaction between direct
taxes, benefits, and the WFTC for a one earner couple with two children. The
figures are shown in 2000-01 prices, but incorporate the effect on income tax
(and hence take-home pay) of the Child Tax Credit which was announced in the
1999 and 2000 Budgets, but will only start in April 2001. Several effects of the
WFTC are apparent:
                                                
17 Blundell et al. (2000) suggest an increase in participation of around 30,000 people,
with a benefit to the public finances which reduces the net cost of the increased
generosity of WFTC by about a seventh.
Figure 9:  Gross and net income, under Budget 2000 system
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 It makes a sizeable contribution to those with low earnings – up to £104
per week for those with the lowest earnings, and more for those working
over 30 hours per week.18 As the Government is keen to stress, someone
working full-time at only the minimum wage would have take home pay
and WFTC of at least £208 per week, compared to benefit income out of
work for this family of £158 per week (although allowing for housing and
council tax benefits the gap is smaller).
 Its effect is to carry most working families, except those with very low
pay, off Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit (unless rent is much
higher than the typical council rent used here).
 This, in combination with the lower, 55 per cent, WFTC withdrawal rate
as income rises means that the most severe aspects of the ‘poverty trap’ –
where higher gross earnings have little effect on net incomes – have been
reduced.
 Entitlement to the credit extends well up the earnings scale, nearly to
average earnings in this case. As a corollary of the reduced depth of the
poverty trap, a milder version of it affects more people.
Note: 2000-01 system includes Child Tax Credit, full reform of NICs, and June/Oct 2000
increases in child elements of WFTC/HB. 1997-98 system uprated by statutory indexation to
April 2000.
                                                
18 In the figure it is assumed that earnings of £111 or more represent at least 30 hours
work. In practice, the jump in the WFTC schedule could come at higher earnings
levels for those earning more than the minimum wage.
Figure 10:  Net incomes 1997-98 and Budget 2000 systems
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Figure 10 compares the relationship between gross earnings and net
income under the system created by the 1997 to 2000 Budgets with what the
situation would have looked like if the tax structure and benefit rates of April
1997 had simply been adjusted by the rules for ‘statutory indexation’ for
inflation up to April 2000. The difference between the two reflects not only the
introduction of the WFTC, but also a number of other important changes,
including:
 Reduction in National Insurance Contributions for the low paid (taking
account of the reforms to be finalised in April 2001).
 Abolition of the Married Couples Allowance in income tax and its
replacement by higher rates of universal Child Benefit and the Child Tax
Credit (the latter actually in effect in April 2001).
 Higher elements for children in means-tested benefit rates.
 Replacement of the old initial 20 per cent rate of income tax with a 10 per
cent band.
Taken together the Budget measures mean significantly higher net
incomes for this kind of family over a wide range of below-average earnings –
more than £25 per week at the lowest levels, rising to a maximum of nearly £60
at the point where Family Credit would previously have run out.
This kind of example suggests that the reforms to the tax and benefit
system since May 1997 have significantly helped low paid families with
children. However, what is in effect a single family type (a one earner couple
with two children aged under 11) represents a small minority of the population
as a whole,19 and it is this group which has been most favoured by the reforms.
The impact of the reforms on the population as a whole might look very
different. To establish this one needs to look at their effects on a representative
sample, and to compare the net incomes generated by the tax and benefit system
resulting from the reforms with calculations of what they would have been in
the absence of reform. The results of such an exercise, carried out on the
Cambridge University Microsimulation Unit model, POLIMOD, are shown in
Figure 11. This compares the results for the whole population of the system
created by the Budgets between 1997 and 2000 with an ‘unchanged’ system, as
it was in April 1997 (but with benefit rates and tax thresholds adjusted for
inflation according to the rules for ‘statutory indexation’). They update
estimates of the impact of the Budgets up to 1999 given in Piachaud and
Sutherland (2000). The columns show the difference in net incomes (adjusted
for family size, or ‘equivalised’) for each successive tenth of the income
distribution, with the poorest tenth on the left. Results are shown for all
households and for just those with children in each tenth.
                                                
19 Families consisting of two adults with two children, regardless of earnings status,
made up just over 9 per cent of all households in 1998-99 (Harris, 2000, table 7,
appendix 1).
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Source: POLIMOD.
The reforms analysed include those described above to National
Insurance Contributions, benefits for children, the WFTC, abolition of the
Married Couples Allowance and introduction of the Child Tax Credit, the basic
rate cut to 22 per cent and replacement of the 20 per cent income tax band with
the 10 per cent band. They also include: introduction of the minimum wage; the
winter fuel allowance for pensioners (at £150 per year); the more generous rates
of Income Support for pensioners (the ‘minimum income guarantee’); the real
increase in the upper limit for NICs; abolition of mortgage interest relief;
abolition of special benefits for lone parents; and reduction in Incapacity
Benefit for those with pension incomes. They do not take account of indirect tax
changes (which include higher taxes on tobacco and petrol but lower VAT on
domestic fuel), or of the change to the taxation of pension fund income
announced in July 1997.20 Nor do they allow for any benefits from lower
                                                
20 It is hard to establish what the distributional impact of this measure was given that its
effect could be higher employee contributions than otherwise to occupational pension
schemes, lower pensions to be paid out by them in future than otherwise, or lower
contributions by firms to their schemes (or fewer ‘contribution holidays’ for them).
The impact – on current contributors to schemes, on future occupational pensioners,
or on shareholders – is likely to have been progressive, so that if one could adjust for
Figure 11: Impact of Labour Bdugets 1997-2000
(compared to statutory indexation)
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unemployment as a result of macroeconomic management or the New Deal
programmes or for any changes in behaviour (such as increased labour force
participation) resulting from the reforms. They do, however, give a clear
indication of the impact of many of the most important measures.
Overall, the reforms have a net cost to the Exchequer of around £6.7
billion.21 This includes £1.2 billion from the WFTC compared with Family
Credit, £1.1 billion on the pensioners fuel allowance, £1.4 billion on higher
Child Benefit, £2.2 billion on higher Income Support and non-means-tested Job-
Seekers Allowance (from higher child allowances and higher rates for
pensioners), and £1.9 billion from reduced NICs. The income tax changes
(excluding the WFTC) largely cancel one another out, and other measures raise
a little over £1 billion net.
Allowing for a £1.3 billion increase in gross earnings from the minimum
wage, households gain £8.1 billion overall – an increase in average household
income (adjusted for household size) of 1.7 per cent. As Figure 11 shows,
however, gains are much larger than this for lower income groups on average,
particularly those with children. The poorest tenth gain nearly 7 per cent (10 per
cent for those with children), and the next tenth nearly 6 per cent (12 per cent
for those with children). In percentage terms these gains fall as one goes up the
distribution, while the richest tenth is 0.4 per cent worse off than it would have
been in the ‘indexed’ 1997-98 system. On this comparison, the four Budgets
since 1997 have clearly had a progressive effect, with significant gains at the
bottom and small losses at the top.22 Allowing for indirect tax changes the gains
at the bottom would be somewhat smaller,23 and if one could take account of
pension fund taxation the losses at the top would be larger, giving a more
clearly redistributive picture. It should also be noted that the changes have
varying effects within income groups, so that even for families with children in
the poorest tenth, 25 per cent are ‘losers’ under the changes (for instance, some
lone parents with older children), while 75 per cent are ‘gainers’.
One of the main controversies around New Labour’s policies has been
what one can call its ‘selective universalism’ – increasing some social security
benefits, but not others, and spending on some services like health and
education but not others. Critics on the left have called for increases in all social
                                                                                                                                  
this the figures shown in Figure 11 would become less favourable to those at the top
of the distribution.
21 Not allowing for the cost of raising public sector wages to comply with the minimum
wage.
22 For more detailed analysis of the effects of the first three Budgets, see Piachaud and
Sutherland (2000).
23 A similar exercise carried out by the Institute for Fiscal Studies after the 2000 Budget
suggests gains of 9 per cent to the poorest tenth from the 1997-2000 Budgets and a
loss of about 0.5 per cent for the richest tenth (Guardian, 23 March 2000, p.28).
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security benefits beyond the rate of inflation – for instance for the basic state
pension to be increased with earnings rather than just with prices. Without this,
the relative living standards of those dependent on benefits will fall.
It should also be noted that ‘statutory indexation’ of the benefit and tax
systems actually delivers a gain, other things being equal, to the public finances.
First, if benefits are only price-linked, and incomes are growing in real terms,
the cost of social security falls in relation to national income and to taxes taking
a constant share of it. Second, if features of the direct tax system like the
personal allowance or threshold for higher rate tax are only uprated for price
inflation, rising real incomes pull taxpayers higher up the schedule. This ‘fiscal
drag’ means that tax rises as a share of income. Chancellors can ‘index the
system’ but still benefit from a rising direct tax ratio.
For both these reasons, it is interesting to compare the results of New
Labour’s fiscal policies with an alternative ‘neutral’ policy. What would have
happened if all benefit rates and all the features of the direct tax system which
are set in cash terms had been increased not just in line with price indexation,24
but in line with income growth? After all, other things (such as changes in
unemployment or demography) being equal, this kind of uprating would be
consistent with a constant tax ratio and constant social security spending as a
share of GDP (and thus with continued fiscal stability if this had been achieved
to start with). It can be argued that this is a more appropriate ‘steady state’
benchmark than price indexation.
The Treasury forecasts that between 1997-98 and 2000-01 money GDP
will have grown by 16 per cent.25 Figure 12 shows the distributional effects,
again by comparison with statutory indexation, if all benefit rates and direct tax
thresholds had been uprated by this amount. First, instead of the net cost to the
public finances of £6.7 billion compared to indexation from actual policies, this
alternative would have had a net cost of £9.2 billion. Uprating with incomes
would have meant £6.4 billion in higher benefits, compared to the £4.8 billion
under actual policies (including the WFTC as a benefit for these purposes). The
Government has indeed spent less than it would have done under an ‘Old
Labour’ policy of uprating all benefits with incomes. At the same time, uprating
with incomes would have meant £2.7 billion lower direct taxes (mainly income
tax) than under statutory indexation. This gives the measure of the fiscal drag
from which the Chancellor has benefited – more than the £1.9 billion he has
‘given away’ in his reforms to NICs, which explains one of the ways in which
the tax ratio has risen despite the tax cuts.
                                                
24 Some features of the tax and benefit system are not even adjusted for inflation under
statutory indexation as they are not covered by it – for instance, earnings disregards or
the capital limits for means-tested benefits.
25 HM Treasury (2000a), table C3.
25
Source: POLIMOD.
Overall, household incomes would be 2.1 per cent higher under this
‘neutral’ policy than under statutory indexation. As benefits are the most
important part of this, the largest ‘gains’ are at the bottom – nearly 7 per cent
for the poorest tenth, and 6 per cent for the second group. Effectively, this is the
increase in real benefit rates needed to keep up with rising overall living
standards. The top tenth would have gained 0.7 per cent (mainly through the
elimination of fiscal drag). The comparison with Figure 11 is instructive.
Overall, the bottom four tenths do almost exactly as well under New Labour’s
policies as they would have done if all benefits had been linked to incomes
without any change in structure. This is despite the £2.5 billion lower net cost to
the public finances of actual policies. About half of this lower cost reflects the
gains coming from outside government through the minimum wage. The other
half is because the higher income groups do slightly worse under actual
policies, and the top tenth is one per cent worse off under them. Within the
lower income groups families with children do better than under straight income
indexation, so other groups do worse.26
One assessment of the Government’s record would thus be that it has
simultaneously delivered as much to low income groups as more expensive
                                                
26 For instance, while households with pensioners in the bottom tenth of the overall
distribution gain as much – 8 per cent – under both policies, those in the second tenth
gain 4.3 per cent under actual policies, but would have gained 6.4 per cent under
income indexation.
Figure 12: Impact of Uprating Taxes and Benefits with Incomes 1997-
2000 (compared to statutory indexation)
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‘Old Labour’ policies would have done, while generally going with the grain of
the progressive parts of public opinion described in section 3, reforming the
structure of the system to improve work incentives overall,27 and delivering the
improvement in the public finances charted in section 1. In these terms, it is a
very impressive achievement.
Alternatively, one could say that the tax and benefit reforms have only
barely delivered enough to the lowest income groups as a whole to prevent
inequality rising: any actual catching up of relative living standards at the
bottom will have to come from the improved labour market and rising numbers
in work and off benefits. By themselves the measures may stem the tide of
rising inequality, but not reverse it. And even to continue standing still in these
terms will require a flow of new measures benefiting the poor. This may be hard
if the case for financing them has not been made through positive promotion of
what is needed as well as what has been achieved.
Official calculations suggest that the measures taken so far ‘will lift 1.2
million children out of poverty’,28 using a poverty line of half average income.
Independent analysis confirms this order of magnitude for the reduction in the
numbers compared to those if no changes had been made.29 However, it is still
too early to tell whether child poverty will actually fall by this amount, and
indeed whether inequality and poverty as a whole will fall. This is for three
reasons. First, tax and benefit changes are only part of the picture. What
happens to unemployment and the distribution of market income also matters.
Second, inequality and relative poverty measures like half average income set
Government a moving target: real income increases at the bottom are needed
just to keep up with rising living standards. Without them, inequality and
relative poverty will rise. We will not know how all these factors play out until
we see analysis of the actual income distribution, rather than just the
simulations of the kind shown in Figure 11.
But there is a third problem, highlighted by the latest official income
distribution figures published in April 2000 shown in Figure 13. This shows the
Gini coefficient measure of household income inequality over the period from
1977 to 1998-99, Labour’s second year in office. It shows inequality of four
measures of income, reflecting the impact of the tax and benefit system as
described in section 2: market income; gross income (which includes cash
benefits); disposable income (which deducts direct taxes from this); and post-
tax income (which deducts the ONS’s estimates of indirect taxes as well). The
picture in earlier periods shown will be familiar to those who have followed the
story: market income inequality grew almost continuously from 1978 to the
                                                
27 Although not for all groups, as Piachaud and Sutherland (2000) explain.
28 HM Treasury (2000a), p.8.
29 Piachaud and Sutherland (2000).
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early 1990s; the other measures grew less in the early 1980s, but very rapidly in
the second half of the decade; under the Major government there was first a fall
and then a rise in inequality.
What is new in these figures is the picture it gives of changes between
1996-97, the Conservative’s last year in office, and 1998-99, Labour’s second
year. While market income inequality did not change, the other measures each
rose by one percentage point. As most of this occurred between 1997-98 and
1998-99, inequality clearly rose at the start of Labour’s time in office. What was
happening was that gross incomes at the bottom – largely driven by benefits,
which remained price-linked – were falling behind rising real incomes higher up
the distribution. As a result the total numbers with incomes below half the
average – the nearest measurement we have to a poverty line – rose between
1996-97 and 1998-99.30
                                                
30 By between 0.5 million measured before housing costs or 0.2 million after housing
costs (DSS, 2000b), table H1.
28
Source: Harris (2000). Figures are for inequality of household incomes.
Table 4: Tax and Benefit Reform Implementation Lags
Measure Announcement Start Full effect Visible in
distribution
statistics
New Deal July 97 Jan 98 1998-99 2000
Minimum Wage Manifesto Apr 99 1999-00 2001
NIC reform (1) March 98 Apr 99 1999-00 2001
WFTC March 98 Oct 99 2000-01 2002
Child Benefit, children’s
benefit rates
March 98 Apr 99 2000-01 2002
NIC reform (2) March 99 Apr 01 2001-02 2003
Child Tax Credit March 99 Apr 01 2001-02 2003
Integrated Child Credit March 00 2003? 2003-04 2005
How can this be reconciled with the picture given in Figure 11? The
answer is the time-lag effect, summarised in Table 5. Few of the reforms
discussed above were announced until March 1998 or later, while one of the
features of tax policy under New Labour has been the gap between
announcement of policies and their implementation. By 1998-99, none of the
reforms benefiting the bottom of the distribution analysed in Figure 11 was in
place; the WFTC will only have its full effect in 2000-01; some measures will
not have their full effect until 2001-02. While in some cases this kind of delay is
Figure 13: Effects of Taxes and Benefits on Inequality 1977 to 1997-98
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inevitable given the administrative reforms required, it does mean that it is too
early to judge whether New Labour’s strategy for tackling poverty and
inequality is a success. Indeed, for those not directly affected by the measures
themselves it will be some time before we can gauge their impact from official
analysis of the income distribution. This takes time. For instance, on previous
patterns, it will be 2002 before we see either the ONS analysis of the household
income distribution for 2000-01 or the key DSS figures for Households Below
Average Income, which will give us a clear picture of the impact of the WFTC,
a reform announced in March 1998.
Conclusion
Writing in 2000, an analysis of the kind presented in this paper shows a better
balance in the public finances than would have been the picture at almost any
point in the last quarter century. This is not just a matter of steady economic
growth, fiscal stability, and the ‘Golden Rule’. It is also that the balance of tax
and spending changes announced since 1998 has real prospects of helping
growth in living standards for the poor, while carrying the weight of public
opinion behind the measures used to do this and to improve public services. At
the same time, if progress is going to be made towards the abolition of child
poverty in twenty years promised by the Prime Minister, the measures described
above will have to be added to every year. Otherwise, incomes at the bottom
will slip behind again, as they did up to 1998-99. This will not be possible if
taxation is thought of by politicians and the public as simply a ‘burden’, and if
the positive, enabling results of what it finances are left unconnected to it.
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